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Abstract. Abstract. During the previous three decades, mutual financial firms have been 
experiencing a process of demutualization, and some of the non-for-profit banks have 
become publicly listed companies. Hence, the persistence of the Spanish Savings Banks 
constitutes an interesting case study. In line with recent literature, this paper attempts to 
reach a better understanding of the factors that have contributed to the persistence of 
these entities in the long run and to the maintenance of a very specific model of 
corporate governance. Regulatory influences, politics and political institutions have 
proved to be key elements of a model which has proved capable of delivering successful 
outcomes in increasingly competitive conditions. Nonetheless, the financial crisis would 
seem to have exacerbated the stresses and strains within this model and, in combination 
with the pressure of increasingly globalized markets, the Spanish Savings Banks find 
themselves in a new scenario. 
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1. Introduction 
In the 1980s and 1990s there was an intense process of financial deregulation. On the 
one hand, there was the demutualization of the building societies, life insurers and 
general insurers. On the other, some of the non-for-profit banks became PLC’s. These 
institutions included the trustee savings banks in Great Britain and the casse di 
risparmio in Italy, while in France the caisses d’epargne merged to form a single 
cooperative group. These transformations had a strong impact on the structure of the 
market, on the competitiveness of the financial industry and on the behaviour and 
performance of financial firms in general. In the cases cited above, the intense 
regulatory change affected the type of property and the corporate governance of these 
organizations. This phenomenon was global in nature and various countries and 
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continents were affected including, of course, Europe, but also, North America and 
Australia. For more than a century, many of these financial firms had played an 
important role in the insurance and banking industries and hence, it should not be 
surprising that these processes have awakened such intense interest in researchers, 
policy makers and those working in the industry. 
Along these lines, the insurance industry has also provoked much interest, and 
even more so in recent times, since the firms working within the sector are mutual or 
stock companies with long histories behind them.1 However, the central thesis offered 
by this paper involves banking. In the banking industry not-for-profit firms also 
compete with for-profit organizations. As Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale show, the 
industries where the two types of firm compete are particularly interesting when it 
comes to corporate governance.2 These are some of the features that characterize the 
Spanish case. The cajas de ahorros (hereafter savings banks) became totally integrated 
in the financial system without losing their status as not-for-profit firms and, at the same 
time, maintaining the basic features of their corporate governance. The financial 
reforms began in earnest at the end of the 1970s but the savings banks maintained their 
sectorial status. The persistence of their peculiar form of governance structure 
constitutes an interesting case for study, particularly since the current financial crisis 
appears to be curtailing this historical continuity.  
On the one hand this paper attempts to facilitate a better understanding of the 
factors that have contributed to the longevity of this model of organization and the 
maintenance of a very special form of corporate governance. On the other, it analyses 
why the model, which has been capable of delivering successful outcomes in 
increasingly competitive conditions, has finally succumbed to the pressure of 
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increasingly globalized markets. This analysis is based on historical evidence and a 
close look at the literature which has tended to focus on the insurance industry. 
The savings banks in Europe were entities that were established in order to 
capture savings. This set them apart from the credit cooperatives and other mutual banks 
which aimed to provide better access to credit for their associates.3 The savings banks, 
because they were non-profit entities, financed their capital via donations and adopted 
this institutional set up precisely in order to protect their ‘commercial’ clients, that is, 
their depositors. This occurred simply because the donations only took place at the 
outset of the savings banks’ activity. Subsequently they became ‘commercial non-
profit’ institutions. As Henry Hansmann indicates, ‘the savings bank industry is 
unusually interesting: it is a unique clear example of an industry in which nonprofits 
arose, from the beginning, primarily as a response to asymmetric information on the 
part of paying customer rather than to protect donors or other third-party payors (such 
as the government)’.4 Numerous authors agree that the emergence of not-for-profit and 
mutual firms was a response to situations of serious market failures. Specifically, the 
savings banks appeared as a consequence of problems related to asymmetric 
information, in contrast to some mutual insurance companies (property and liability 
insurance), which appeared as a kind of protection against specific oligopolistic 
structures.5 Within this framework, one of the key factors in the long term was the 
impact that the changes in the regulatory structure had on these entities. The persistence 
of institutions like the savings banks obliges the analyst to consider the role played by 
regulation in the control of the financial system and, as a result of this influence, just 
how these organisations responded to these stimuli.6 
Mark Casson suggests that the organisational structure adopted by firms may be 
analysed as though this were a rational response to information costs. As these costs 
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change, the pressure exerted obliges the intermediaries to adapt and, in consequence, 
organisational change takes place.7 This model has been successfully used by Monica J. 
Keneley as a means of analysing the demutualization of life insurers in Australia during 
the 1990s.8 The present paper considers the role of regulation from the same 
perspective, that is, as a factor that restricts or distorts the way the market behaves. By 
extension this model can also explain the evolution of firms that are subject to specific 
property and governance structures.9  
However, one other factor that cannot be ignored within the framework of a long 
run analysis, a factor which is closely linked to institutional criteria, is the role of 
politics and political institutions. Douglass C. North and Mary M. Shirley have recently 
underlined the overwhelming influence of politics and political institutions as 
determinants of financial development.10 Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn highlight 
that it is these factors, within the broader context of regulation, that are relevant for 
corporate governance. They situate features of this scenario within the framework of the 
political system whereas other authors have done so within the context of the ‘legal 
family’.11 Stephen Haber looks at the role of the political framework and compares the 
financial systems of the US and Mexico. He studies the long term success or failure of 
policies that attempt to restrict competition via banking law and finds that this 
depended, to a large extent, on the degree of openness of the political system itself. The 
approach taken by these authors in considering the intensity of the relationships 
between political institutions and financial development creates a highly consistent 
framework for analysing the case in hand. The evolution of the Spanish Savings Banks 
is intimately linked to certain regulatory and political cycles, stages of development 
which have tended to dramatically influence the contemporary history of Spain. These 
cycles may be separated into five distinct periods: the General Primo de Ribera 
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Dictatorship (1923-1930), The Second Spanish Republic (1931-1936), The Civil War 
(1936-1939), The General Franco Dictatorship (1939-1975) and democracy (from the 
constitution of 1978). 
Savings banks’ documental records constitute an invaluable source of evidence. 
The Banca Privada Section in the Bank of Spain Archive (ABE, BP) offers a special 
view of the relationship between the Public Administration, the banks and the savings 
banks. In addition, documents with the CECA Secretariat and the excellent Collection 
of regulatory norms from the different savings banks, housed in the Caixa Galicia 
savings bank archive, and in the Bank of Spain Library, were also of special interest. 
Relevant information was also obtained from historical series in; the Statistics of Bank 
of Spain Newletters (BEBE), the CECA (Annual Reports and Statistical Yearbook) and 
the Spanish Statistical Yearbook.  
Consequently, section two looks briefly at the history of savings banks. Section 
three analyses the ownership structure of Spanish savings banks in order to highlight 
certain features of analytical importance. Section four studies regulatory influences 
during the interwar period. Section five compares the contradictions that exist between 
the systems of corporate governance administered during the dictatorial political regime 
(1939-1975) and the evolution of same during the democracy. Section six offers some 
concluding remarks. 
2. Brief historical background 
This work has been carried out within the framework of leading economic research into 
the history of the savings banks up to the present date. From the work of Braulio Antón 
Ramírez in 1876 and José G. Ceballos in1929,12 the first contributions within the field 
were provided by researchers that succeeded in placing the savings banks within the 
broader context of Spanish historical development.13 More recently, Angel P. Martínez 
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Soto and Joaquim Cuevas have focused on the institutions’ dual roles as both charitable 
and financial institutions and, against this backdrop have analysed their consolidation 
and expansion until the Spanish Civil War.14 There have also been many important 
parallel contributions within the field, some of which have been from the perspective of 
corporate history and the regional character of the savings banks.15 Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo 
was able to link specific strategic developments in savings banks such as the 
collaborative alliances, in particular, with regard to IT outsourcing.16 Finally, Francisco 
Comín has succeeded in linking the different historical stages of the above collaboration 
and successes of the Spanish savings banks, measured as a proportion of market quota 
(deposits and credits).17 
Spanish savings banks have remained largely private organisations, constituted as 
foundations. They are commercial non-profit firms, operating as financial entities, 
without de facto owners.18 Given their charitable and social character, they dedicate a 
proportion of their profits to investments which are in the public interest (obra social - 
social works, hereafter ‘social dividend’). The savings banks first came into existence in 
1834 and their number peaked at 133 savings institutions in 1928.19 This was the year in 
which a savings banks’ association with 76 affiliated members was created; the Spanish 
Confederation of savings banks (Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro, CECA). 
A process of amalgamation reduced the number of these entities to 45 independent 
savings banks in 2008.20 In the last thirty years, using CECA as hub, the savings banks 
have managed to integrate the additional burdens of increased costs and the risk of 
profit reinvestment with enough efficiency.21 
3. Savings banks, ownership and why it matters 
There would appear to be some confusion within the literature when it comes to 
qualifying an area of fundamental interest like the Spanish savings banks' property 
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structure and governance. It is worthwhile clarifying some of the idiosyncratic aspects 
of Spanish savings banks such as statutory self-governance, the weakness of their 
mutual profile, and what sets them apart from government-owned banks. 
 The 29 June 1880 law officially recognised the statutory and regulatory 
autonomy of the savings banks.22 During the interwar years this process of regulation 
culminated in the Estatuto de las Cajas Generales de Ahorro, the  savings bank law 
(Decree of 14 March 1933), which set out the legal framework for the savings banks up 
until the 1977 reforms (Fuentes-Quintana Reform, Royal Decree 2290/1977). In short, 
right up until the Governing Organs of the Savings Banks Act (Ley de Órganos 
Rectores de las Cajas de Ahorros, LORCA, Law 31/1985 of 2 August), their statutes 
and self-regulation constituted the basic mechanisms by which these banks were 
controlled and regulated. These norms outlined their governance structures and the 
extent of their power, subject, of course, to the general regulation of the State. 
A feature of Spanish savings banks that distinguished them from their US and 
European counterparts was the weakness of their ‘mutual’ profile. The old-established 
statutes of the savings banks gave the depositors a relatively important role as the 
beneficiaries of social dividend and as representatives in the organs of governance 
working alongside other interested parties. The first of these gradually disappeared in 
favour of the society as a whole and the second, as will be shown below, has always 
been of limited importance.  
Finally, recent empirical literature tends to place the savings banks under the same 
umbrella as the government-owned banks.23 Strictly speaking, it is not possible to 
consider the savings banks as government corporations. This approach has its roots in 
the circumstances surrounding the period immediately prior to the deregulation that 
began in 1977. During the Franco dictatorship, the controls exercised with respect to the 
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savings banks’ investments and governance were responsible for accentuating the public 
nature of their activity in practice, if not necessarily in a legally formal sense.24 During 
the financial reform that was taking place in parallel with the process of institutional 
democratization, the above confusion was fed by the role of local and regional public 
administration as represented on the savings banks’ governing boards and with respect 
to their demands for finance. However, neither the LORCA, nor the subsequent 
legislative developments have transformed the essential nature of these institutions as 
private foundations. Very recently, the reforms brought about by the 2010 (Royal 
Decree-Law 11/2010, of 9 July) and those that are taking place now in 2011 are 
changing the profile of these entities dramatically, since they facilitate the conversion of 
the savings banks into commercial banks using the participation of private capital. 
The fact that the savings banks had no proprietors as such and no inalienable 
property rights is important for two reasons. Firstly, these factors conditioned the 
structure of their organs of governance and secondly, they were important because these 
features have remained intact over a long period of time. The structure and composition 
of the organs of governance of each savings bank were freely defined by its own 
statutes.25 The role of certain private individuals in the formation process of the savings 
banks was clearly reflected in the case of the Jumilla (Murcia) savings bank, created in 
1901. In the presentation of their statutes it was stated that:  
‘In order to carry out certain improvements for the benefit of the people, the 
official protection of funds is not absolutely necessary. Similarly, financial 
support from the State or provincial or municipal authorities is not 
absolutely necessary. When there is the capacity to put into action a 
country’s living forces and elements, all that is required is private 
initiative.’26 
In other cases, in spite of the fact that there were savings banks that came into 
existence under the protection of the local authorities, the statutes made it clear that the 
9 
 
citizens chosen to form part of the banks’ governing bodies should be completely 
independent. The San Sebastián savings bank, created in 1879 is a good example: 
‘This establishment was legally considered to be an association created and 
regulated by and through the City Council, by the free will of the persons 
taking part and with the funds it obtains through loans, deposits and other 
means which will be explained in the following sections.’27 
Within this context it is difficult to find relevant, broad-ranging statistics, but, it 
may be possible to generalise without inordinate speculation. The structure of the 
governing bodies of the savings banks has been made up of the bank’s founders, local 
authorities, and a swathe of representative groups (professionals, local businessmen, 
priests and savings banks employees and depositors). This basic composition was 
reflected in the organs of governance, via which the vacant posts were covered by a 
system in which the board voted to designate who was to occupy a given seat. This is 
one of the characteristics of the non-profit firms whose boards of directors are 
essentially self-appointing.28 The peculiarities inherent in each case were the 
consequence of the statutory self-governance that characterized the savings banks. With 
respect to the number of organs of governance, the nineteenth century tradition seems to 
have established two: a supervisory organ, normally the assembly, and the board of 
directors. The structure of the Assembly was usually reflected in that of the Board.29 
The members of board, since they have no effective property rights, are unable 
gain access to the surplus that might accumulate due to the successful administration of 
the organization. The way in which residual earnings had to be distributed was not 
regulated until the Statute of 1933. This new regulation established that 25 per cent of 
residual earnings should be placed in reserves (retained earnings), another 25 per cent in 
voluntary reserves and asset depreciation, and the remaining 50 per cent should go 
towards social dividend (1933 Statute, art.43-44). However, the members of the banks’ 
organs of governance did have the power to control the running of the organization. The 
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variety of the groups that had a presence within these organs of governance brings us 
back to the idea of stakeholders. In the case of the savings banks, agency problems and 
the focus of shareholder value30 have little relevance to companies in which these 
factors do not exist and, the stakeholder approach, while having many advantages, lacks 
theoretical maturity.31 It must be admitted that the wealth of literature on corporate 
governance increasingly takes into account the participation of workers, clients and 
suppliers within the government of the organizations, together with the traditional 
governance of owners and managers or directors. Consequently, from this point of view, 
savings banks might be considered as providing a model for an alternative way of 
organising businesses.32 
The managerial system adopted by the savings banks in the nineteenth century 
was very simple. The board of directors directly controlled the banking staff. It was, in 
effect, a functional structure which did not differentiate between controlling and 
executive bodies. Business activity was administered from a single office which was 
divided into two sections: the savings section (deposits) and the loans section (monte de 
piedad).33 The framework, within which the savings banks were run, characterised 
fundamentally by flows of asymmetric information, effectively solved the problems of 
administering residual control rights and managed to bypass problems that might have 
arisen because of the absence of an ownership structure. The potential costs of 
monitoring the staff were reduced via the use of two instruments.34 On the one hand, the 
central office manager took part in the board’s debates, but he did not have a vote. The 
second of these instruments was a device by which one member of the board was placed 
in charge of the operational activity of the central office each week according to a rota – 
‘the appointed member for the week’. 
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Another direct consequence of the fact that the savings banks had no owners was 
a lack of capital. This was an endemic feature of entities that operated as ‘commercial 
non-profits’ however, in the case of the savings banks, their commercial activity was 
limited, since their only means of obtaining capital came from the accumulation of 
reserves. Essentially, it was this that set them apart from the rest of their non-profit 
counterparts. These organisations were capable of accumulating large surpluses 
(endowments) that allowed them to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of the 
market.35 Consequently, the savings banks had to rely on other means of protection in 
order to subsist in the long term. The historical evidence highlights the extent of the 
impact of a protective regulation in each of the political periods of both the last and the 
present century.  
4. Late regulatory influences 
Until the 1920s, there was no consistent regulation of the savings banks industry. At this 
juncture, the regulatory stimulus began to be characterised by profound changes in 
institutional and political arenas as a consequence of the establishment of the General 
Primo de Ribera dictatorship (1923-1930). The new regime carried out an 
antiparliamentary repressive policy within the framework of rigorous interventionism 
with respect to economic policy. A corporative State came to dominate, a process which 
was similar to those taking place in other European countries like France and Italy.36 
Within this framework, there were new regulatory developments that affected the 
savings banks and the banks. The culmination of this process took place after the fall of 
the monarchy within the republican period (1931-1936). 
Prior to these legislative changes, from the end of the nineteenth century, the 
savings banks were progressively diversifying. The most forward-thinking savings 
banks opted to promote a share portfolio and, subsequently, more innovative credit 
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products. Mortgages were slowly introduced by some Spanish savings banks. Later, 
during the first third of the twentieth century, numerous savings banks decided to 
reinforce this credit activity by increasing mortgage lending, loans against promissory 
notes, by offering new deposit products such as fixed term savings accounts and current 
accounts.37 The Catalonian savings banks, particularly the Caja de Pensiones de 
Barcelona and Sabadell, and the Basque and Galician savings banks, together with some 
of those from Andalusia, Valencia and Aragon used this strategy in order to diversify its 
clientele.38 The profile of the savings banks, as described by Henry Hansmann, as the 
only place where the poor could deposit their savings,39 ceased to be an accurate 
description in the 1930s. In short, the savings banks were reducing financial exclusion 
by providing financial services to the working classes and to other social sectors, 
services which the commercial banks were not prepared to offer them. These features, 
linked to the fact that the savings banks were local in nature, and non-profit orientated, 
explains why their clientele were so faithful. 
Spanish banking changed significantly in the first decades of the twentieth 
century. On the one hand, commercial banks became more efficient before WW1 as a 
result of increased competitiveness,40 and the Banking Act of 1921 further increased 
their market power. On the other, regulation affecting the savings banks, which was 
passed between 1926 and 1929 during the dictatorship, reduced the scope of their 
operations. The legislation established mandatory investment rates in public debt and 
created an official registry of savings banks, measures which effectively curtailed the 
autonomy of these entities.41 The Republic of Spain suspended this legislation in 1931. 
The new Savings Bank Statute (1933) created a legal framework that favoured the 
savings banks, protecting them from competition from the commercial banks and 
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strengthening their status as non-profit banks with social aims while consolidating their 
financial activity. 
The restrictions imposed by this changing regulatory framework were bound to 
generate a certain amount of commercial and institutional tension between commercial 
banks and savings banks.42 The creation of the Banking Council (Consejo Superior 
Bancario, CSB) as an umbrella organisation for, what was effectively, a banking cartel 
in 1921, and the CECA in 1928, served to institutionally formalize both lobbies in the 
Spanish banking market. Finally, in 1933, the creation of the Savings Banks Credit 
Institute (Instituto de Crédito de las Cajas de Ahorro, ICCA), as a wholesaler of retail 
finance, with clearing functions for savings banks, served to highlight the sectorial 
conflict.43 In short, this regulatory framework restricted competition and provided 
protection for the savings banks as financial entities with social aims. It also guaranteed 
privileged resources for public finances by establishing that 30 per cent of customer 
deposits had to be invested in government securities. A precedent became established 
which the Franco dictatorship served to reinforce, which involved placing these entities 
in a privileged position via favourable legislation that served to compartmentalize their 
activities within a captive market for various decades. Two features of the savings banks 
that remained unscathed by the new legislation were their legal status as non-profits and 
their statutory self-governance.  
{please place Table 1 near here} 
During this period of intense regulation, new savings banks emerged within the 
Spanish savings market.  From 49 entities in 1900 the number rose to 133 (including 
some mutuals) en 1928, of which 76 were affiliated to the CECA in the same year.44 
Table 1 presents the structure of a significant sample of those social groups that backed 
the savings banks which existed in 1900 and 1927. It is interesting to highlight the 
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importance of private individuals and associations and, in consequence, the secondary 
role of public institutions, in both of the years cited. Between these two dates, the 
percentage fall in the weight of private owners (aristocracy, yeomen, industrialists and 
merchants) within the group of banking promoters was offset by a comparable increase 
in the numbers of cultural associations and unions. As a result, it may be affirmed that 
most of the savings banks that came into existence prior to the Spanish Civil War, were 
deeply rooted in the civil society and were characterized by a private ethos inherent in 
their foundational philosophy. These characteristics might lead us to suppose that they 
define, albeit somewhat generically, the social base of the savings banks, which were 
made up of those interested parties that participated in their governance. A closer look 
reveals the relative paucity of weight that the public administrations held in the 
composition of these bodies. 
As a result of business diversification, a new executive organ was introduced 
which acted as an intermediary between the board of directors and the central office, 
which was somewhat similar to an executive board. From that time onwards, the board 
of directors was to meet only once a year for its Annual General Meeting and for audit 
purposes. However, the principal factor in fomenting increased managerial dynamism 
was the professionalization of the central office manager (henceforth the chief executive 
officer, CEO), who became a salaried figure with a contract and statutory executive 
powers.45 The accentuation of the business profile of the savings banks generated 
increasingly serious agency problems derived, specifically, from their particular 
property structure. There was much confusion between the organs of control and those 
of executive management in the Spanish savings banks. This set the pattern for the 
idiosyncratic nature of the governance structure of the savings banks for the subsequent 
decades.46 It was only a regulatory framework which restricted competition and 
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segmented the banking market which subsequently allowed the savings banks to carry 
out their activity without duress. 
5. Political drivers of corporate governance after the Spanish civil war 
The end of the civil war was followed by a sharp rise in the severity of financial 
regulation. Table 2 reflects the intense regulatory pressure exercised by the Franco 
dictatorship regime after 1940. The new administration had a vested interest in 
establishing the savings banks as entities that were capable of capturing private savings 
and as a vehicle for financing the emission of public debt and other financial assets. 
This legislation simply reflected the financial policy of an interventionist State 
incapable of securing the necessary fiscal income to finance itself. The state’s strict 
tutelage of the savings banks only provoked the cohesion of their regional and national 
corporative organisations. The assemblies organised by the savings banks’ regional 
federations and the CECA itself, acted both as a chain of transmission for government 
mandates and, as a check on the abuse of certain political mandates. These tended to 
treat the savings banks as public agencies.47 
{please place Table 2 near here} 
During the post-war years the government put pressure on the savings banks to 
ensure the sustainability of the sector. In less than six years, approximately 30 per cent 
of the savings banks had been absorbed by others. Many of these were very small, their 
financial survival hanging by a thread and, in most cases, their management procedures 
were obsolete and unprofessional.48 Figure 1 shows how this policy favoured a certain 
re-dimensioning of the savings banks in the 1940’s and 50’s. The policy managed to put 
a brake on a historical trend that involved the steady fall in the concentration and the 
progressive segmentation according to the size of these institutions. However, in the 
three following decades, there were only three savings banks that disappeared due to 
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mergers, such that concentration levels again fell, with the medium level and small 
savings banks gaining weight in the overall proportion of these institutions. There was 
little direct competition between the banks and the savings banks in the financial system 
at this time. The market was overburdened by state products, and the government 
essentially consigned each type of institution to one sphere of influence or another. Both 
banks and savings banks were operating in captive markets. The economic development 
of the 1970’s and the protection provided by the system for the savings banks favoured 
the growth of their market share (deposits and credits). Between 1941 and 1970 their 
share of deposits grew from 15.1 per cent to 33.1 per cent of all of the deposits in the 
banking system (see Figure 1).49 
{please place Figure 1 near here} 
Most of the factors connected to the governance and organisation of the savings 
banks were not regulated by laws as such. However, the administrative interventionism 
and antidemocratic bases of the State favoured the publication of multiple decrees that 
the affected the savings banks’ operations and the way in which their organs of 
governance were run. Firstly, throughout 1947 various government decrees were 
established which stealthily impinged upon the traditional independence of the savings 
banks. Specifically, these norms affected the composition of the board of directors, the 
fact that they had to inform the Ministry of Employment when appointing their 
presidents, directors and the general manager , appointments which the Ministry could 
then veto if it felt so inclined. The number of Board members was limited, irrespective 
of the savings banks’ statutes, as indeed was the length of their tenure.50 Further, a 
governmental decree was passed which allowed the state to appropriate a proportion of 
the savings banks’ profits. These funds went to create the “National Social Dividend” 
(Obra Social Nacional) which was freely administered by the State. During the Franco 
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years, the government procured 15 per cent of those savings banks’ profits which, 
according to the Statute of 1933, should have been used for its own social dividend.51 
Secondly, there was a move to set up new savings banks under the tutelage of 
public administration. Table 1 shows how, between 1927 and 1975, there was sharp 
growth in the number of savings banks established under the auspices of local 
authorities. This change took place when the savings banks promoted by the provincial 
authorities (Diputaciones Provinciales) began to emerge during the years of the Franco 
dictatorship. The number of savings banks increased until there was a maximum of 88 
in 1975. The appearance of these savings banks eventually led to a greater balance 
between those which arose from the private and public sectors, although the savings 
banks that are more deeply rooted in the civil society still predominate.  
Finally, government interventionism hindered the capacity of the organs of 
governance to act efficiently, and this reinforced the figure of the Chairman-CEO a post 
which was typical in the savings banks. The independence of the savings banks 
gradually declined during this period. The corporate governance of the savings banks 
was also seriously affected as bad practice became endemic, which naturally had a 
negative effect on how savings banks ran. The inherent democratic tradition, manifest in 
the existence of stakeholder delegates, as representatives of interested parties which 
were often deeply rooted in the local communities, became somewhat blurred. The 
boards of directors became politicised, affected by Francoist corporatism which 
replaced the representative components i.e. the old democratic unions and local 
administrations, with members of vertical Francoist trade unions and non-democratic 
corporations. 
With the deadweight of old regime’s strictures still in place, the reforms that 
began when General Franco died were of supreme importance. After the creation of the 
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1978 Constitution, Spain became integrated within the framework of the rest of the 
Western democracies. The reforms began just one year earlier, reforms that aimed to 
bring about the modernization of the economy and which affected the whole of the 
financial system and the savings banks. The analysis of the savings banks and their 
corporate governance from 1978 onwards is of particular interest. During this period of 
over three decades, in which there has been a stable democracy, there have been 
profound reforms to the financial system. These reforms have taken place against a 
backdrop in which the world economy has been going through a process of 
globalization. 
The main aim of the financial policy undertaken by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs Enrique Fuentes Quintana was the progressive deregulation of the financial 
system and an attempt to bring it closer in line with European standards. Spanish 
economic growth required a much larger banking system. After the crisis and banking 
reconversion at the beginning of the 1980’s, policy makers aimed to place the savings 
banks on an equal footing with the commercial banks (see Table 3 for regulatory 
details).52 
{please place Table 3 near here} 
The LORCA and the 798/1986 Royal Decree of 21 March established that the 
administration, management and control of the savings banks corresponded to the 
General Assembly, the Board of Directors and the Control Committee (the 
Remuneration Committee, Investment Committee and the Audit Committee, the latter 
being specific to the savings banks, and chosen by the Assembly and its members). As 
Alvaro Cuervo states, on many occasions, some of these committees, particularly the 
investment committee have a decisive influence on the role of the Board of Directors, 
creating a ‘paper screen’ which leads to the risk of encouraging irresponsible behaviour 
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by the CEO.53 These circumstances highlight some of the difficulties involved in 
exercising control over the managers from the organs of governance made up of 
stakeholders (including public administrations). 
The reform of the organs of governance in the mid nineteen eighties defined a 
representative structure that was later modified, as a consequence of regional 
legislation, as one in which the weight of public representation was increased, and 
varied between 25 and 75 per cent. Finally, national Law 44/2002 incorporated certain 
aspects of European legislation which reduced the weight of public presence on the 
organs of government. After these adjustments, the average representative structure for 
the set of savings banks as a whole has become more balanced: the public sector has an 
average representation of 34 per cent, which rises to 41.5 if the percentage 
corresponding to the public founders is taken into consideration. The deviations from 
the average are high and correspond to both the large and small savings banks. Only 22 
per cent of the savings banks have a level of public representation in their Assemblies 
which is lower than one third.54 Some entities have developed a more diversified 
representative structure in their governance bodies. As is the case of the ‘La Caixa’, one 
of the foremost savings entities in the country, one means of doing so would involve 
reducing public participation (21 per cent) and by augmenting the presence of cultural 
and social institutions. With respect to business participation, there also appears to have 
been strong politicization in the decision taking of the savings banks through the 
influence of regional governments. Sometimes this influence has manifested itself in a 
push to ensure that certain projects remain within the regional territory and, in others, 
by supporting certain rescue packages.55  
The Spanish case reflected certain critical aspects that affect corporate governance 
in a stakeholder regime. Without doubt, the structure of the organs of governance means 
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that the risk of politicization will remain. The legislation initiated during the democratic 
regime was not capable of preventing the growing participation of public 
administrations, probably as a consequence of the inertia of the Franco period, which 
served to dampen the tradition of the savings banks as independent depoliticised 
entities. There are many contradictions that arise during this period. Firstly, it would 
appear to be logical that the regional governments, which have supervisory powers, 
should not have administrative powers as well, since this would establish a glaring 
conflict of interests.  Secondly, much of the decision making process undertaken by 
public administration representatives became politicized. As some authors claim, the 
risk management derived from these decisions affects the stakeholder system and, as a 
result, it should be the interested parties who set out to debate the underlying 
implications of these policies.56 Thirdly, there remained the problem of how to control 
the managers? In this regard, it would almost certainly be prudent to introduce an 
element of market dynamics within the savings banks’ organs of governance and to 
increase the number of stakeholders.57  
These latent contradictions within the savings banks’ system of governance 
became more acute as the savings banks grew through a period of successive mergers 
and an expansionist policy that protected them from the competition of the commercial 
banks (for an indication of the asymmetry between them, see Table 3). Figure 1 shows 
how from the 1980’s onwards the savings banks increased their market quota until this 
reached more than half of all of the total deposits in the financial system in a period of 
spectacular growth.58 This expansion has revealed a new problem inherent in the 
savings bank system, namely that, in an ever more competitive and open environment, 
they find it difficult to find capital and are harshly exposed to the pressures of the 
markets. 
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{please place Table 4 near here} 
Table 4 provides a long term view of the evolution and structure of the main 
components of the savings banks’ capital. Together with the growth in capital and 
reserves, the increase in the savings banks’ volume of trade has obliged these 
institutions to incorporate new capital instruments which are distinct from the shares 
issued by companies with a traditional property structure.59 The instrument that has 
done most to providing the savings banks with permanent resources has been that of 
subordinated financing, which has swiftly grown to approach the levels occupied by 
equity. However, preference shares have not been an overriding success and have yet to 
provide the same levels of resources as subordinated financing. This data reflects the 
uncertainty that surrounds the capitalization of the savings banks which is the main 
focus of any potential reform in these institutions. Recent events linked to the world 
financial crisis which broke out in 2008 have placed this problem in sharp relief. The 
savings banks have found themselves dangerously exposed to high levels of credit held 
against real estate. The pressure of international markets and the fall of wholesale credit 
have left them with grave problems with respect to their capitalization. The results are 
on the table and the reforms of 2010 clearly did not go far enough (Royal Decree-Law 
11/2010, of 9 July).60 Finally, the government has had to moot the privatization of those 
savings banks that find themselves in serious difficulties (Royal Decree-Law of 
Financial System Reinforcement Plan, 18 February 2011). This latest legislative move, 
which is still a green paper, aims to carry out radical changes affecting their structure as 
non-profits by allowing the entry of private capital. 
6. Conclusions  
Historical evidence reveals two quite remarkable features of the Spanish Savings Banks. 
Firstly, they have, at least until 2011, survived with their model of corporate 
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governance, in spite of the changing influences of regulation, politics and political 
institutions. Secondly, a glance at their growing market quota, (deposits and credits) vis-
a-vis the banks, proves that they have been capable of obtaining successful results in 
competitive conditions.  
This paper focuses the analysis of the Spanish Savings Banks’ governance 
structure by following the recent approaches taken by Stephen Haber, Douglass C. 
North and Barry R. Weingast. Taking their reflections with respect to the relevant 
political institutions and financial development as a starting point, one can trace the role 
and impact of different political cycles. Different political frameworks have supported a 
variety of regulatory scenarios, and these have affected a system of governance based 
upon the different interested parties or stakeholders. During the long period between 
both dictatorships (Primo de Ribera and Franco) regulation became gradually tighter. 
There was a kind of regulatory favouritism that tended to create a kind of dichotomy 
that placed banks and savings banks in markets that were relatively isolated from each 
other. Perhaps the greatest changes occurred after 1947. It was at this time when, via the 
introduction of second order norms, that the savings banks found themselves subject to 
powerful restrictions with regard to their organs of governance. Effectively, these 
organs came under the control of the state, and the restrictions seriously hampered 
structures which had, up until that moment, been deeply entrenched within the civil 
society and which contained an important democratic component. 
The modernization process and the deregulation which took place after the 
restoration of democracy were incapable of eliminating the barriers to entry that 
affected the whole of the banking sector. These criteria offer an interesting insight into 
the strength of the inertia that certain regulatory impacts have in the long run. The new 
regulations homologated the operational procedures of both the banks and the savings 
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banks, which competed with each other in the same markets using their own products 
and networks, but which remained quite distinct with respect to their property and 
governance structures. In the savings banks, the idiosyncratic nature of these features 
served to accentuate the politicization and lack of control of the managerial boards. As a 
consequence, regulatory change did not lead to any substantial changes in information 
costs.61 This scenario is in contrast with the cases of demutualization in the Australian 
insurance industry, analyzed by Keneley, which went through a profound process of 
deregulation. This is because the system maintained at least some of the asymmetry that 
had previously existed since the savings Banks can takeover banking networks, but not 
vice versa. However, external factors, a consequence of Spain's entry into the European 
institutions and globalization laid the savings banks bare to the strictures of 
international regulations, particularly those of the European Union, and the pressure of 
international wholesale markets. The opening up of the financial markets created new 
pressures for the organisational structure of the savings banks. Information costs were 
changing as a result of market globalization and the behaviour and performance of the 
largest and most competitive savings banks (BBK, Unicaja, Kutxa, Ibercaja and La 
Caixa).62 These entities demonstrated a greater capacity to adapt and generally operated 
much more closely in line with market standards (the efficiency of the boards as 
supervisory bodies, greater transparency, and less politicization). However, the financial 
crisis, which began in 2008, meant that the problems mentioned above became an 
intolerable deadweight for the savings banks as a whole.  
In short, the regulatory favouritism which some authors ascribe to the legislative 
treatment received by these not-for-profits Banks,63 finally seems to have crumbled. The 
voluntary opening up of the Spanish financial system, in response, first to the arrival of 
democracy and, later, to globalization and a need to be more deeply integrated within 
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Europe, have made a dual system seemingly untenable. This phenomenology is leading 
to the transformation of these entities into organisations that may be more fully exposed 
to the full rigors of market control. Hence, there is evidence, in the case of the Spanish 
Savings Banks, that supports the hypothesis of Douglass C. North and Mary M. Shirley 
that political and financial systems tend to be congruent in the long run.64  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Promoters of Spanish savings banks in 1900, 1927 and 1975 
(in percentage) 
  
Private 
owners 
Local 
authorities 
Trade unions 
and cultural 
associations 
Catholic 
Church NA 
1900 50.8 20.0 10.8 4.6 13.8 
1927 25.0 10.5 33.5 8.6 22.3 
1975 48.0 41.3 6.7 4.0 - 
Sources: Titos, ‘Las cajas’, p. 217. CECA, Fuentes para la historia de las cajas de ahorro y 
montes de piedad españoles (III), Series Monográficas, 11 (Madrid, 1985), p.101. Ceballos, 
Libro del ahorro. CECA Statistic Yearbook (Madrid, 1983). 
 
 
 
Table 2. Regulatory milestones and sectorial conflicts in Spanish Savings Banks during 
Franco dictatorship period (1939-1975) 
Savings 
bank 
activity  
Supervising 
Body  Regulation Sectorial conflicts 
Financial 
and 
social 
 
Ministry of 
Employment 
and Ministry 
of Finance 
 
 
Ministry of 
Finance  
 
 
 
 
Bank of 
Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1939-64: 
• Banking status quo: entry barriers 
• Baking Law of 1946 
• Control over part of the social dividend by the 
State  
1947-77:  
• Control over investments and obligatory 
investments: securities of the National Institute of 
Industry and privileged financing for private firms  
• Savings banks’ mergers (1940-63) 
• Economic Stabilisation Plan (1959) 
1962: 
• Banking Law 
• Reorganisation of the monetary authority 
• The ICCA became an official body with 
jurisdiction over the savings banks. Its clearing 
functions were absorbed into the public sector  
1969-71: 
• Weak liberalisation of interest rates and  of the 
banking discount rate 
• Establishment of the savings bank and bank 
coefficient 
• Credit Law of 1971, puts savings banks on a par 
with banks  
• CECA assumes the clearing functions that 
pertained to the  ICCA (disappears in 1971) 
• Withdrawal of the legal coefficient of liquidity 
and special discount credits in the Bank of Spain 
1974: 
• Modification of the Bank of Spain’s interest rate  
• Reduction of the investment coefficient  
• Strong pressure to 
finance public 
investments of a 
social nature or 
investments 
established by the 
government as a 
special objective  
 
•Concern about the 
entities’ solvency  
 
• Government 
interventionism over 
the savings banks’ 
policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of Spain Library and CECA Library; author 
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Figure 1. Ratio of concentration of deposits (top 4 and 8 savings banks), deposit market 
share and number of Spanish savings banks (1880-2008) 
 
Notes: not including State owned Postal Savings Bank. Number of savings banks in CECA in 
brackets. In 1928 total number of savings banks (including some mutual banks) 133, of which 
76 were affiliated in CECA. 
Sources: Spanish Statistical Yearbook (1880-1935). Annual Reports of Caja Madrid (1880-
1935). G. Tortella, La banca española en la Restauración, (Madrid, 1974), vol. 1., p. 490 and 
499. P. Martin Aceña,  La cantidad de dinero en España 1900-1935. Estudios de historia 
económica, no. 12 (Madrid, 1985), tables II-1, V-1 and Una estimación de los principales 
agregados monetarios en España: 1940-1962, Documento de Trabajo 8807, Banco de España 
(Madrid, 1988), table I.2.1 and IV.1. CSB, Boletín, Balances de la banca privada (1940-1962). 
BEBE (1963-2008). Annual Report of CECA (1932-2008) and CECA Statistical Yearbook 
(1981-2008). 
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Table 3. Regulatory milestones and sectorial conflicts in Spanish Savings Banks 1975-
89) 
Savings 
bank 
activity  
Supervising 
Body Regulation Sectorial conflicts 
Financial Bank of Spain 
1975:  
• Free opening of offices in each savings 
banks’ area of influence. 
1977: 
• Savings bank mergers and takeovers 
(1976-1985) 
• The Fuentes Quintana Reform: granting of 
definitive equal status between savings 
banks and banks, reform of savings banks’ 
bodies of governance   
1981: 
• Liberalisation of interest rates on active 
operations  
1983: 
• Savings banks can open offices abroad 
1985:  
• Spain joins the European Community 
• Law of the Governing Bodies of Savings 
Banks (LORCA): the participation of 
stakeholders is specified  
• Savings banks-banks investment 
coefficients are equalised  
1987:  
• Liberalisation of interest rates 
1988:  
• Freedom of territorial expansion granted to 
the savings banks  
1989: 
• Progressive disappearance of investment 
coefficients  (until 1992) 
• Multiple objectives, but solvency is 
the priority 
 
• Conflicts of interest grow among the 
parties  
 
• Asymmetry between savings banks 
and banks: savings banks can takeover 
banking networks, but the banks 
cannot purchase savings banks  
 
• What guarantees exist with respect to 
the independence of the management 
of savings banks vis-à-vis public 
administrations? 
Source: Bank of Spain Library and CECA Library; author 
 
Table 4. Equity and other instrument of capital in Spanish savings banks, 1962-2008 (in 
percentage of equity) 
 
Total Equity 
(000 of  €) 
Capital, 
reserves and 
others (%) 
Social 
dividend 
fund (%) 
Subordinated 
debt (%) 
Preferred 
stocks (%) 
1962 11 323 3.0 97.0 - - 
1965 37 233 55.2 44.8 - - 
1970 140 547 78.6 21.4 - - 
1975 404 794 67.1 32.9 - - 
1980 1 739 371 91.3 8.7 -  
1985 3 916 844 91.3 8.7 - - 
1990 8 465 869 90.2 9.8 - - 
1993 11 454 437 79.3 8.4 12.3 - 
1994 12 599 654 80.8 7.9 11.3 - 
1995 13 875 368 81.9 7.5 10.6 - 
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1996 15 853 179 82.6 7.1 10.3 - 
1997 18 203 526 84.1 6.6 9.3 - 
1998 20 255 548 80.7 6.4 12.9 - 
1999 22 511 254 76.0 6.2 17.8 - 
2000 25 103 838 72.9 6.0 21.1 - 
2001 27 664 240 44.1 5.9 27.8 22.2 
2002 30 340 200 40.5 5.6 32.6 21.3 
2003 32 955 892 37.2 5.5 36.3 21.0 
2004 36 041 092 34.8 5.3 39.2 20.7 
2005 43 688 352 34.8 4.9 41.0 19.3 
2006 49 444 416 31.3 4.9 45.2 18.6 
2007 59 207 096 37.8 4.8 41.1 16.3 
2008 63 855 968 29.7 4.7 50.3 15.3 
Sources: BEBE and CECA. 
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